ers" (those who are not directly engaged in specific SMOs but who are believed to be supportive because of some shared characteristic such as race, ideology, or religion).
To investigate this topic, the article begins with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of existing quantitative research on ORA. Following this, I detail what qualitative literature on covert repression tells us about the topic and then make some initial tests of derived propositions. For the analysis, I use a new database of antiradical ("Anti-Red"), covert activity undertaken by fourteen police and intelligence organizations in the United States directed against a Black Nationalist organization named the Republic of New Africa (RNA) in Detroit, Michigan, between 1968 and 1973. Avail- able by the neighborhood-month (N= 3,136) , this constitutes the only publicly accessible database on the subject. Results disclose that the use of electronic and physical surveillance was influenced by contemporaneous and contiguous dissent, prior and contiguous repressive activity, income level, and the number of dissidents (RNA members) who lived within a neighborhood. Results also disclose that these relationships vary according to the racial makeup of the locale in question. For example, within predominantly white neighborhoods, authorities used very little CRA, but within predominantly black neighborhoods, covert activity was more frequent in nature, influenced by the amount of RNA activity, overt repression, lagged CRA, and income to more specifically target behavior. Based on these findings, the con outlines several new areas of research relevant to state repression and protest policing.
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STATE REPRESSIVE ACTIVITY
Empirical research on overt repressive action has grown significantly over thirty years. During this time, a clearly defined class of behavior has deve serves as the focus of investigation: actions taken by authorities against individuals and/or groups within their territorial jurisdiction that either restrict the behavior and/ or beliefs of citizens through the imposition of negative sanctions (e.g., applying curfews, conducting mass arrests, and banning political organizations) or that physically damage or eliminate citizens through the violation of personal integrity (e.g., using torture, disappearances, and mass killing). Over the same time period, there has also developed a clear consensus on the appropriate theoretical framework for the behavior of interest. Within existing research, most scholars identify that repression results from a decision-calculus undertaken by political authorities (e.g., Dahl 1966; Walter 1969; Goldstein 1978; Duvall and Stohl 1983) , where the costs of taking such action (e.g., decreased legitimacy, spent resources, and increased resistance) are weighed against the benefits (e.g., increased legitimacy, longevity, and decreased resistance).
As conceived, if benefits exceed costs, then ORA is expected; if costs exceed benefits, then ORA is not anticipated.4
Unified conceptually and theoretically, all of the quantitative literature relevant to overt repression has been engaged in the systematic assessment of diverse explanatory variables. Within this work, three types of explanatory factors have received support.
In an effort to understand CRA, it thus makes sense to begin our inquiry with identifying what research on the most comparable form of state behavior5 has to tell us about causal determinants.
CHALLENGES, COERCIVE HABITUATION, AND CONTEXT
Research has consistently found that dissent (a "challenge") compels authori apply some form of political sanction directly against those engaged in this b well as against everyday citizens not directly connected with challengers/challenges (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Moore 1998; J. King 2000) .
The perceived benefit of using ORA in the face of a challenge is simply the elimination of the threat confronted and the increased chance of political survival for leaders, poli-test influences ORA in the same manner. The magnitude and type of state response have been found to vary according to the frequency and type of protest confronted.7 Despite these differences, however, all findings identify that protest increases repressive activity.
The second variable identified within the literature concerns the "coerciv tion" of political authorities (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenp As stated by Gurr (1986, 160) In this case, organizational benefits result from maintaining tional history. When authorities have previously engaged in ORA so in the future.
The third explanation for overt repression concerns the broa context within which state-dissident interactions take place (e.g. democracy or the level of economic development). These variables are important because their presence influences the perceived costs and benefits of taking action. For instance, most research has found that the amount of democracy present during a nation-year reduces the responsiveness of authorities to dissent because the political system reduces the capability and willingness to engage in repression (e.g., Davenport 1995 (e.g., Davenport , 1999 J. King 2000; Davenport and Armstrong 2004) .
CHALLENGERS, BOTH REAL AND IMAGINED
Set within the framework of the decision-calculus above, the three variables ide fied are important for our understanding of why authorities use coercion. When considers covert repression, however, then they come to question the importance o these variables. There are essentially two reasons for this.
First, although both ORA and CRA are concerned with neutralizing challenges facilitating the survival of political leaders as well as existing political-econom structures, the objectives pursued by these techniques are distinct. As underst ORA is used by repressive agents in an effort to directly control or eliminate o challenges to authority (e.g., Walter 1969; Goldstein 1978) . This action informs targets/victims as well as bystanders that certain actions/beliefs are not dee acceptable and that the state will sanction those who behave in this manner. In cont the purpose of CRA is to collect information about challengers within a particular ritorial jurisdiction (e.g., Marx 1974; Wise 1976; Churchill and Vander Wall 19 7. For example, violent dissent tends to increase violent overt repressive action (ORA; e.g., Po
Tate 1994), and diverse forms of dissident activity tend to increase the sheer volume of restrictions that apply, while less diverse forms tend to be ignored by authorities (e.g., Davenport 1995). Koehler 1999; Cunningham 2004 ). This action informs authorities about what ing place and who is involved with these actions, so that they can better ass threats and weaknesses within these organizations to initiate action against th Second, ORA and CRA use fundamentally different means. In the case of th mer, arrest, intimidation, and killing are the strategies of choice. These activ involve public and frequently violent forms of state power (e.g., victims are phy arrested or beaten in view of some audience), and targets as well as potential targ intended to know exactly what is being done to them and by whom. These activit also generally collective in orientation: groups of authorities take action against groups of citizens. In the case of CRA, however, wiretapping, tails (following targets), and mail openings are the weapons of choice. These activities involve private as well as nonviolent forms of state power, and targets are not supposed to know anything about what occurred (reducing backlash-a consistent problem in the ORA literature).8 In addition, these activities are more individual in orientation: they are undertaken by individual agents of the state against individual citizens and/or locales with some association with a social movement/political challenge.
Of course, the identification of targets is not straightforward. Pre gests that there are essentially two types: "real" and "imagined," each relationship to CRA. These are discussed below.
Real targets. For some, the primary focus of covert repression is with those individuals explicitly involved with challenging authority. These actors are the lifeblood of social movements for they are the ones who participate in group action. Monitoring these individuals (where they work, sleep, worship, shop, and "hang out") provides crucial information about who dissidents are, what they are doing, and what they might do-a major benefit to authorities in countering protest. Now, one might ask, why apply CRA across so many aspects of a dissident's life? The answer is simple.
Within the mind of covert repressive agents, challengers do not stop being challengers when they leave a rally (something implicit within ORA literature). Rather, they are challengers all the time; consequently, information about domestic challenges might be revealed at any point during their daily life. In short, CRA does not privilege the public lives of targets; instead, it encompasses all aspects of them.
Clearly, SMO participants would not only serve as the subject of information.
Equally as important, these individuals could also serve as a source of information about other targets, as they meet previously unknown members of the SMO, supporters, and dissidents from other organizations and encounter places where members gather but do not engage in dissent. Monitoring these individuals and places provides crucial information about not only who dissidents are and what they do but also who might become a challenger as well as what locales might be used for recruitment, meetings, training, and protest in the future. The logic of applying CRA across all of these targets is simple as well: it is unclear exactly which "leads" produce valuable information, and thus authorities pursue many at the same time.
8. Authorities may want targets to suspect that they are being covertly monitored, but the technique does not rely on the awareness of the target.
From the discussion above, the benefits of applying CRA against "real" targets w CRA are straightforward. If these individuals and locales are put under surveilla then authorities can increase knowledge about diverse aspects of challenges and lengers. The costs of applying CRA against real challengers are also straightforw First, one must pay an agent to follow targets and plant wiretaps. Second, it is pos that if covert efforts were exposed, members of the challenging group would rally together in some sense, and it is possible that the opinion of bystanders would shif positively toward the social movement organization and negatively against political authorities as such activity might be judged intrusive and/or illegal.
Imagined targets. The previous section assumed that authorities have a general about who and what they were looking for (e.g., the identity of a challenger or a ing place). If authorities did not have information that led them to specific indiv or locales, however, and they were still interested in identifying challenges/chal ers, then they would have to engage in more vaguely targeted activity. Of cours not expected that this behavior would be random in nature for this would be costly. Rather, I expect that authorities would employ some quick reference guid determine where they should place their efforts. In other words, it is expected t they would use some "profile" of the challenges and challengers (some simplistic, descriptive sorting mechanism) that divided the relevant population and geographic space into those people and places that were worthy of CRA and those that were not.
What could serve as a mechanism to develop a profile? Evidenced within the antired campaigns of the early 1900s, as well as by COINTELPRO and the "War on Terrorism" in the United States, it is clear that easily identifiable characteristics of the challengers being confronted provide guidance to repressive agents in their selection of targets such as race, age, income, or religion. If this information were known, then authorities could apply CRA to the locales within which similar individuals could be found (i.e., specific countries, regions, or neighborhoods) and attempt to obtain useful information. For example, if one were trying to confront a dissident group composed of radical Islamists, blacks, or poor people in the United States,9 then one would direct covert repressive activities against locales where these people lived and/or where they gathered socially. This would allow authorities to find out about who was in (and who was not in) a particular social movement. In addition, it would allow authorities to observe preprotest and postprotest activity (e.g., recruitment, training, organizational meetings, etc.).
Clearly, the costs and benefits of such an investigation vary dance to the ease with which profile characteristics could be this is especially the case in a democracy (the concern of this extremely sensitive about political rights and popular legitim behavior. I discuss three scenarios below.
Target-rich environments. In areas where many individuals could be found who are similar to the targeted SMO, it is possible that the cost of CRA would be minimal and 9. The more obvious the descriptive characteristic, the better (e.g., physical characteristics).
would be the most responsive to other factors present at the time. For example, when protest occurred within these environments or when other police/intelligence activity was taking place, authorities would likely apply large amounts of CRA. These oth factors would assist the authorities in better pinpointing targets within the loca being discussed. Equally, if not more important, these other factors would provide authorities with the necessary justification for CRA; if they were exposed, then they could simply provide the reason that they had "just cause" and be considered legitimate in their actions. Indeed, in these situations, if authorities did not take such action, then they might be deemed inefficient, uncaring, and undeserving of support (financial This objective was to be achieved through a threefold strategy: (1) the holding of a plebiscite among African Americans to determine the "national status" of the "New Afrikan population in North America" as well as through the use of other consciousness-raising activities; (2) the purchase of five states from the U.S. government: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina (which would comprise the new country); and (3) the granting of reparations from the United Staes for the treatment of blacks as slaves (Republic of New Africa 1968).13 Toward these ends, the RNA engaged in many legal forms of protest: rallies, petitions, political education courses, "self-defense" programs, food drives, lectures, conferences, and the publication of "independent" newsletters/newspapers. The organization also engaged in numerous illegal and violent activities as well: robberies, shootouts with police, plots to bomb state and federal buildings, and even a plane hijacking.
Of course, no one would be surprised to find out that the U.S. government did not sit idly by in the face of such behavior. Numerous authorities were engaged in the polic-12. The core membership of the group ranged between 50 and 200, but the number who engaged in dissent reached upwards of 2,000 individuals at times. These individuals came from all walks of life (the U.S. military, teachers, lawyers, machinists, barbers, etc.).
13. The Republic of New Africa (RNA) had far-reaching plans. Internationally, the group's leaders were in contact with a number of African governments and were attempting to establish trade and exchange programs with foreign countries. They also planned to make contact with the governments of Cuba, China, and Vietnam. The responses of authorities were far-reaching as well, casting a wide net. For example, the U.S. Department of State, the Internal Revenue Service, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were tracking RNA activity nationally, and even local Detroit police departments were coordinating their efforts with other police departments as well as national organizations.
Detail, Detective Division, Homicide, Criminal Division, the Public Complaint sion, and Tactical Reconnaissance), the Michigan State Police (Special Investig Bureau, Special Investigation Unit), the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. D ment of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Almost all of these or tions engaged in the arrest of RNA members for various offenses, conducte tronic and physical surveillance, opened mail, and placed informants as well as a provocateur within the SMO for the purposes of obtaining information and disr From reading the available literature, it is clear that race served as the dominan file characteristic used by authorities in their confrontation with the RNA (and logically). As Donner's (1990, 291 ) preeminent study tells us, A number of cities, of which Detroit is a prime example, reflected in their police stru tures and target priorities a similar "urban pathology": a decaying black ghetto, ... emergence of potentially violent black and white groups, and the development among white policemen of a "siege mentality" against the black community.
Both before and after the ghetto riots of the late sixties, self-help and violence inevitably came to be regarded in both camps-police and ghetto-as a vital means of survival. "Law and order" became a coded battle cry as the police were transformed into an army defending white power and the status quo. In this confrontation, the urban intelligence unit (the "Red Squad") played a key role. Blacks-their organizations and activitiesbecame prime targets for ongoing surveillance regardless of their political views.14 This statement is important because it reveals that race was significant in authorityblack relations, especially amid the backdrop of the 1967 riot in Detroit (Locke 1969 )-an event "in which forty-three were killed, hundreds wounded, and 7,200
arrested, not to speak of the millions of dollars of property damage" (Donner 1990, 292) . Within this environment, one would not expect that blacks and whites would generally receive similar treatment as authorities attempted to identify, monitor, and counter the RNA. Indeed, it seems likely that white authorities would not use CRA against other whites in the city or their segregated neighborhoods. In contrast, it seems quite reasonable to expect that white authorities would be much more likely to use CRA against African Americans (all throughout the city) in their efforts to investigate and counter the RNA. During the time, the African American population was commonly identified as the "enemy" of and the "threat" to the status quo. In part, this was because they had just recently engaged in violent activity in the form of a riot; CRA would thus be justified as a preventative measure. In part, this was due to the practice of institutional racism within police and intelligence organizations (frequently cited as the main reason for urban riots in the 1960s [Fogelson 1968; Locke 1969] ). In addition to this, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, African Americans were not economically or politically powerful enough to the existing structure of authority in Detroit to compel coercive agents to fear being exposed (e.g., Darden 1987; Donner 1990; Dawson 1994) . The costs of CRA would thus be minimal.
14. Interestingly, even black police officers were subject to surveillance when it was "perceived" that they were sympathetic to the challenging organization (Donner 1990, 293 To measure the dependent variable for this study, I counted the total number of covert events that took place within a neighborhood during a month (i.e., wiretaps, tails, and mail openings). The data identify 2,961 events in thirty-six neighborhoods."17
To measure "coercive habituation," I used several other variables from the same database. Within ORA literature, bureaucratic inertia within repressive institutions is measured by lagged repression-repression at time t -1. With the expectation that prior repression leads to later applications, such an indicator implies that all prior 15. These data are housed at the Radical Information Project at the following address: http://www. bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/proj2.htm; these are also housed at the Journal of Conflict Resolution Web page: www.yale.edu.unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
16. The temporal aggregation was used in an effort to analyze a low level of aggregation was used for three reasons: (1) beats and districts for the time period neighborhoods are frequently used jurisdictions for many urban activities, and (3) at the neighborhood-level that allowed me to address context. 17. In an effort to avoid a problem with endogeneity, I have not considered the existence of an informant/agent provocateur in a meeting as an instance of covert repressive activity. Rather, I have used CRA only to refer to activities in which authorities have directed some agent of the state to take some action (e.g., to follow an RNA member or to plant a microphone in someone's home).
activity within a particular domain would be related to all other activity that occ later, wherever it takes place. As I believe that authorities were more likely to act eit where they have been before or very close to where they have been previously, I cr To measure challenges (dissident activity), I again use information from the Red Squad file. Within the larger effort, I coded the following characteristics: * the activity undertaken by RNA members (e.g., business meetings, fund-raising, food shopping, shooting practice, riots, being at home, demonstrations, social gatherings, political education courses, petitions, speeches, mock trials, and rallies); * the identity of specific individuals attending events; * the approximate number of individuals in attendance at each event;
* the geographic location of the activity-by street, longitude, and latitude; * the date-by day, month, and year; and * the time-by hour and minute.
From this database, four indicators of challenge were created: the total number of RNA actions undertaken in a particular neighborhood, measured contemporaneously 18. The Red Squad file provided more information on overt activities. As a result, I was not able to construct an events-based database comparable to the information available on covert activity. I was able to use available information within the records as well as anecdotal information to identify two rather large ORA events that appeared to be the most important in the RNA case.
(variable 1); a one-month lag of this measure (variable 2); the mean of all RNA activities in contiguous neighborhoods, measured contemporaneously (variable 3); and a one-month lag of this measure (variable 4). In total, 763 events of RNA activity (including protests, mock trials, meetings, and political education courses) were identified in twenty-six different neighborhoods.
To assess challengers, two variables were used: one created from the Red Squad file (real) and one from the commissioned report (imagined). First, I consider the number of RNA members who lived in a particular neighborhood. According to the database, 208 RNA residences existed within thirty-six different neighborhoods throughout the time period examined.19 Second, in an effort to capture the dominant profile characteristic applied during the campaign, I converted the percentage of the population that was black within a neighborhood (available within the TALUS report) into quartiles.
Here, quartile 1 includes neighborhoods where the percentage of blacks was less than or equal to 25 percent, quartile 2 includes neighborhoods where the percentage of blacks was greater than or equal to 26 percent but less than 50 percent, quartile 3 includes neighborhoods where the percentage of blacks was greater than 50 percent but less than or equal to 75 percent, and quartile 4 includes neighborhoods where the percentage of blacks was greater than 75 percent.
Method. As I contemplated analyzing causal relationships, I was sensitive to the fact that the dependent variable was an event count. In addition, I was also sensitive to the fact that with data on forty-nine neighborhoods over a span of sixty-four months (total N= 3,136), this data set was comparable to the cross-national, time-series databases used within comparative studies of ORA, in which the nation-year was the unit of analysis (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995) . Given the data structure, this study relies on a variant of negative binomial maximum likelihood regression (Long 1997) , which was specifically created to deal with panel data-in particular, the "xtnbreg" command in STATA (STATA 2001, 386-94) .20 The equation To allow for the investigation of political "profiling" based on race, I also parse the database into quartiles and reestimate relationships. Although this approach deviates from much of the literature on ORA that has come to rely on some form of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 19 . The number of addresses assigned to each neighborhood is the same across the full time period for I have not yet pinpointed (on a monthly basis) which individuals were and were not active members in th organization. Within future research, I am exploring this spatial dimension more intensely (e.g., employing street addresses and the Geographic Information System [GIS]).
20. Likelihood ratio tests were used to determine the appropriateness of the technique. 1995), in line with research by G. King (1989) and Krain (1997) , I believe that cedure adopted here is valid.
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COVERT REPRESSION
To begin the analysis of covert activity, I follow in the tradition of the over sion literature by pooling all observations and regressing the different measur sent, lagged repressive action, income, RNA residential concentration, and the centage of African Americans in a neighborhood on the dependent variable. When estimated in this manner (Table 1, Significantly deviating from the research on overt repressive action influenced by when and where dissent took place (either contemporan by one month, or within surrounding neighborhoods). While CRA did n dissent, however, it did respond to dissidents. According to the results, RNA members in residence within a neighborhood increases the amoun and electronic surveillance directed against the RNA. Evidently, it did dissidents did with regard to the application of wiretaps, mail opening only where they were located.
Even more important (as gauged by the incident rate ratio), CRA wa the behavior of repressive agents. As found, prior covert action in the well as contiguous behavior increased covert activity. Authorities were in CRA where they had done so before and nearby to other repressive action. Interestingly, large-scale ORA was found to decrease the application of CRA. When efforts were taken, which likely significantly hindered the Republic of New Africa (e.g., raids as well as the mass arrests at New Bethel and in Mississippi), authorities decreased the amount of covert behavior directed against the dissident organization.
Results also disclose that the application of CRA was influenced by income and race. Specifically, it is found that wealthy neighborhoods were less prone to be put under physical and electronic surveillance as authorities confronted the RNA. In addition, the number of blacks within a neighborhood decreased the amount of covert activity applied. This suggests that target-rich environments (which could potentially lead to extensive costs being extended) generally resulted in a diminished effort on behalf of authorities.
COVERT ACTIVITY AGAINST ETHNIC TARGETS
Up to this point (and similar to existing literature on ORA), limited attent been given to the fact that costs and benefits for repressive activity would be distinctly across contexts and that causal relationships might vary across territorial jurisdictions (in this case, neighborhoods). Within the RNA case, however, I would 21. The particular variant of the negative binomial regression for the cross-sectional time series that I employed ("xtnbreg") does not report conventional goodness-of-fit measures such as R2 or even pseudo-R2.
Consequently, I focus attention on statistical significance and causal direction.
T A B L E 1 E x p l a i n i n g C o v e r t R e p r e s s i o n , b y N e i g h b o r h o o d -M o n t h s ( N e g a t i v e B i n o m i a l R e g r e s s i o n )
F u l l M o d e l f 2 5 P e r c e n t > 2 6 P e r c e n t t o 5 5 0 P e r c e n t 2 5 1 P e r c e n t t o l 7 5 P e r c e n t > 7 6 P e r c e n t argue that race plays an important role in the use of CRA-a role very similar to the role of age during the period of campus radicalism in the 1960s within the United States and Western Europe or that played by religion and ethnicity in the current "War on Terrorism." When one reads about the case, it is hard to ignore the fact that the authorities were predominantly white, "serving" a small white community in the city, and that the RNA was exclusively black, "serving" a large black community in the same place. From available information, it is also readily apparent that those neighborhoods with higher concentrations of African Americans within them would likely be perceived as more "threatening" to existing authorities-being particularly vulnerable to the claims-making efforts of the RNA and having just recently participated in the racially charged riot of 1967. In many respects, it seems fair to suggest that the racial issue was one of, if not, the most important factor underlying the political-dissident interaction (e.g., Fogelson 1968; Locke 1969; Bergeson 1982 ).
An element such as race is something that is generally missed within a literature in which neither "dissidents" nor "authorities" are given identities outside of the roles/ functions that they have as "challenger" and "defenders of the status quo." Recently, however, a call has been made by Sidney Tarrow (1998) to invoke such issues into investigations of contentious politics. Specifically, he invites researchers to move away from "eventless" (abstract/decontextualized) investigations toward those that are "eventful" (historically and contextually rich). Such an effort makes a great deal of sense in the RNA case because it is possible that our understanding of how and why covert action is applied relates to the targets of such behavior.
To address the possibility that CRA varied according to the percentage of the neighborhood that was African American, I divided the data into quartiles (see Table 2 ). When the forty-nine neighborhoods of Detroit were divided in this manner, unsurprisingly I found that within principally white areas with the highest mean income (quartile 1), RNA-related protest and covert activity related to the RNA were limited.
Actually, it is rather surprising to find that there was any at all. In the second quartile, one can observe a bit more protest and covert action. Reestimating the model by quartile (Table 1 , columns 2-5), the empirical findings reveal patterns that are generally different from the pooled analysis.
T A B L E 2 U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e V a r i e d B e h a v i o r a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f D e t r o i t , b y E t h n i c i t y
P e r c e n t a g e o f P o p u l a t i o n B l a c k Q u a r t i l e 1 : Q u a r t i l e 2 : Q u a r t i l e 3 : Q u a r t i l e 4 :
5 2 5 P e r c e n t 2 2 6 P e r c e n t t o d 5 0 2 5 1 P e r c e n t t o 5 7 5 P e r c e n t 2 7 6 P e r c e n t C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n t e r e s t ( n = 1 , 2 8 8 ) ( n = 4 6 4 ) ( n = 5 2 8 ) ( n = 8 5 Within neighborhoods where the percentage of the black population was less th 26 percent, authorities only responded to the number of RNA homes and prior cove activity, both of which had a positive influence on the likelihood that CRA would used. When potential targets were fewer in number, authorities restricted covert act ity to hard and previous targets.
Within neighborhoods where the black population was slightly larger (i.e., where the percentage is between 26 and 50 percent), authorities responded to dissent as w as overt and covert behavior. For instance, results disclose that contemporaneous dis sent increased CRA-maintaining the largest influence in the model (again gauged by the incident rate ratio). The influence is short-lived, however, as lagged dissent tends decrease repressive behavior. This likely reflects the fact that protest locales shifted over time. Again, prior CRA increased contemporaneous activity. In fact, the inciden rate ratio for this variable reveals that while less important than contemporaneous p test, it was more important than either lagged or contiguous dissent-repression tended to stay put after it had been applied, regardless of whether protest continued at this locale. Finally, and consistent with the full model, the Mississippi raid decreased the amount of CRA-albeit with a relatively small influence on the dependent variable.
Within locales where the African American population w 51 percent but less than or equal to 75 percent, dissident be vant at all. Contiguous and lagged covert repression were f raneous behavior-again revealing that authorities using covert action were more likely to "chase" themselves, with contiguous activity wielding the greatest explanatory weight within the model. Similar to the full model and the previous quartile, the raid in Mississippi again decreased CRA. Interestingly, income decreased covert repressive activity when the number of potential targets (as defined by race) was increased; authorities thus sorted the relevant group according to income-the wealthiest of the blacks were spared covert action, while the poorest were targeted.
When the number of African Americans was greater than 76 percent and the number of potential targets was at their highest level, the explanatory model looks quite similar to the previous quartile: lagged CRA had a positive influence on covert activity, while the raid in Mississippi and income decreased its application. The only difference exists with reference to the number of RNA homes. As found, when confronted with a large number of potential targets within a neighborhood, authorities used explicit involvement with the dissident organization as a means to select targets. Participation is less significant than lagged CRA (as gauged by the incident rate ratio), and thus it is more important where CRA has been used before than where an RNA member lived; nevertheless, involvement was an important factor in influencing authorities.
CONCLUSION
The present study attempts to improve our understanding of state considering CRA. This form of state behavior is perhaps the most fr political authorities against those within their territorial jurisdiction, invasive of citizens' lives, extending into where they sleep, worship, meet, work, and so forth. At the same time, this form of state behavior is also the least well understood.
Indeed, unlike overt activity, CRA has never been rigorously analyzed. Using a new database on U.S. domestic intelligence activity applied against a Black Nationalist organization during the 1960s and 1970s (the Republic of New Africa), there are several lessons that could be drawn from this research.
First, we have learned that CRA is comprehensible within a framework that includes insights from both quantitative literature on overt repressive activity as well as qualitative literature on covert action. Both are useful, but it is clear that more effort needs to taken to understand the latter since the explanatory model that was developed from this synthesis was only able to account for moderate levels of variation within the dependent variable.
Second, we have learned that any approach that characterizes repression as a series of isolated events in space, time, and context should be treated as suspect. This study reveals that covert repression is enacted by specific authorities, against specific subsets of a population, in a specific social-geographic space. While pursuing the Republic of New Africa, for example, it was clear that not all parts of Detroit were targeted; rather, particular sections were highlighted (those deemed "threatening"). Far too little effort has been spent discussing the importance of place as well as diffusion across space within domestic conflict situations. It is clear that this must be explored further because our research must begin to address the complex realities that one sees within relevant sociopolitical phenomena.
One of the most important keys to improving our compreh as overt) repression appears to reside in better identifying th repressive agents themselves, identifying "benefits" as we these actors into diverse contexts. For my case, the answer white agents involved in Red Squad activity and assessing their relationship to the RNA, blacks in general, and the rest of the white community in Detroit. This is something not frequently addressed within a literature that tends to shy away from pinpointing perpetrators and one that is generally more interested in investigating events or conditions applied across a wide geographic area without disaggregating the spatial domain in question. Upon reflection, however, this approach is quite unreasonable for no one would assume that in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that New York would see the same type of overt or covert activity against diverse social movement organizations and/or citizens as that observed in Milwaukee or San Diego.
Indeed, existing research on state repression tends to characterize events as something of an agentless enterprise where compelled by large macroforces; things just happen.
We can no longer treat repression as actorless and devoid of context; as the present study reveals (and as the September 11 situation compels us to see almost daily), the "who," the "where," and the "when" are essential to understanding the "why."
Following the suggestion made above, this study also leads me to recommend that further research should focus more on the targets of repressive activity. Without such information, we cannot begin to understand the logic behind CRA or its impact on society. For example, within the post-September 11 context in the United States, by not paying attention to the target of covert behavior, we would be unable to determine the degree to which individuals of Arab descent would be targeted relative to other groups and how long the targeting would persist, whether other individuals who approximated the targeted group would be subject to investigation (i.e., all "others" who fit the physical characteristics: Latinos, light-skinned blacks, etc.), and if covert activity worked (i.e., if it led to arrests and diminished terrorism undertaken by the relevant dissident organizations). Without this information, we would be unable to identify what actually led to the imposition of CRA in the first place (e.g., speech, association, and/or action). This last point is particularly important for it may be the case that individual-level activities better account for variation in CRA than the more grouplevel factors highlighted within this article.
The issues identified here are by no means marginal in importance to those who study (or are subject to) coercive forms of state power and those interested in democracy. As but one example, in a recent New York Times article by David Johnston and Don Van Natta (2001), it was noted that "some officials are now saying they need broader authority to conduct surveillance of potential terrorists, no matter where they are" (e.g., homes, religious institutions, meeting places); these are now no longer conversations but actual government policies. This raises important issues about freedom of speech, assembly, and so forth. Authorities are suggesting that state power should be extended into diverse areas throughout society, without clear criteria for initiation or withdrawal. Unless we begin to direct attention to such matters, however, we will be left without a clear understanding of how wide a net is cast over society in the search for "challengers," how long such a net is cast, and what is caught within this net.
Disclosure of such activity is never an easy matter. In the RNA case, Red Squad files were released only after a series of media reports and diverse individuals brought cases against the state (Capos 1981) . The files used within this study are important because they leave us with a decent understanding of what happened, but unfortunately, this disclosure took place after about twenty to twenty-five years. While this is too late to address any abuses that existed in Detroit at the time (on both sides), it does prompt us to be more concerned with such issues in the current context. It is hoped that we will have a greater commitment to monitor and investigate covert repressive activity in the present as well as to understand what it means for the state, the challengers (both real and imagined), and the everyday citizens who all too frequently end up being caught between the two.
